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HUSH!: THE CRIMINAL STATUS OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION AFTER MCNALLY AND CARPENTER AND
THE ENDURING PROBLEM OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION
John C. Coffee, Jr.•
Each of the last three decades has witnessed an intense public reaction to a
distinctive type of "white collar" crime. In the early 1960's, public attention
was riveted by the Electrical Equipment conspiracy and the image of senior
corporate executives of major firms meeting clandestinely to fix prices. 1 In the
mid-1970's, the focus shifted to corporate bribery, as the media ran daily stories regarding questionable payments abroad and illegal political contributions
at home. 2 The representative white collar crime of the 1980's is undoubtedly
"insider trading." The archetype of this new kind of criminal in the public's
mind is Ivan Boesky (or perhaps his fictional counterpart, Gordon Gekko,
from the movie Wall Street).
In response to each of these scandals, there has been much moralizing,
some legislation, and ultimately a few academic voices expressing concern that
the legislative response was hasty and overbroad. The phrase "overcriminalization" first entered the lexicon of the criminal law with respect to morals legislation in the late 1950's, 3 but in the wake of the 1960's price-fixing scandals it
• Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of his colleagues, Professors Harold Edgar and Jane Ginsburg, but any
errors remain those of the author alone.
Copyright, John C. Coffee, Jr. (1988).
1. Some 29 corporations, including General Electric and Westinghouse, and 44 individuals
were ultimately indicted on price-fixing charges. See Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REv. 929, 929 n.l {1961); see also Administered Prices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 28 (1961) ("Price Fixing and Bid Rigging in the Electrical Manufacturint? Industry"). Several
vice-presidents of General Electric and Westinghouse served federal prison sentences for their role
in this industry-wide conspiracy that has been described as involving "the most serious violatious
of the antitrust laws since the time of their passage at the turn of the century." Geis, The Heavy
Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in M.D. ER.MANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE AND
GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE 123 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting from decision in Application of the State of
California, 195 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1961)).
2. For overviews of this connected series of scandals, see Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63
Va. L. Rev. 1099 (1977); Herlihy and Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8
LAW & POL'Y lNT'L Bus. 547 (1976). Over 350 corporations, including Exxon, Gulf, United
Brands, Lockheed and Northrop, disclosed to the SEC questionable foreign payments and instituted reform measures in consequence. Coffee, supra, at 1102-03.
3. This debate was triggered by the release of the Wolfenden Report in 1957, which recommended the decriminalization of prostitution, homosexuality, and similar morals offenses. HoME
OmcE, ScOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT, REP<>RT OF THE CoMMTITEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSnroTION ("WOLFENDEN REPORT") (1957); see Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Reply
to Professor Junker, 19 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1972); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374
ANNALS 156 (1967).
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was extended to apply to economic crimes as well. In particular, Professors
Herbert Packer of Stanford and Sanford Kadish of Berkeley suggested that
there were unnoticed and significant costs in using the criminal law to enforce
economic regulations. 4 They warned that over-reliance on the criminal law
would erode its moral authority, misallocate its enforcement resources, and invite discriminatory and selective prosecutions. All these dangers were greatest,
they claimed, when the regulated behavior was not generally recognized as immoral by the public_ at large. The "illegal payments" crisis of the 1970's
spawned the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and another debate ensued about
the role of the law in regulating corporate governance.'
The current insider trading revelations have yet to result in legislation, but
have, however, produced a Supreme Court decision, Carpenter v. United
States,6 that exhibits all the characteristics of an overbroad, moralistic legislative response. In Carpenter, the Court held unanimously that an employee
who leaks to third parties confidential business information belonging to his
employer embezzles property in violation of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes, even though the employer suffers no apparent economic injury as a
result. 7 At bottom, Carpenter rests on an analogy that broadly characterizes
the unauthorized communication of trade secrets as equivalent to the crime of
embezzlement.
·
As will be argued, this view of "confidential information" as a form of
property covered by the laws against larceny is (a) historically unsound, (b)
inconsistent with most statutory law dealing with the subject of trade secrets,
and (c) capable of trivializing the Court's decision only months earlier in
McNa//y v. United States, 8 which clearly sought to cut back on the amoeba4. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); Kadish, Some Observations on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 423
(1963); see F. Allen, The Criminal Law as an Instrument of Economic Regulation, Int'l Inst.
Econ. Research (Orig. Paper No. 2, 1976).
5. See supra note 2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which chiefly amends the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, and 78ff (1982
& Supp. Ill 1985).
6. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
7. In response to the defendant's claim that The Wall Street Journal had suffered no injury,
the Court answered that "it is sufficient that the Journal has been deprived of its rights to exclusive use of the information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business information and most private property for that matter." Id. at 321. The defendants in Carpenter
traded in the stock market on the basis of knowledge of the contents of forthcoming items in The
Wall Street Journafs "Heard on the Street" column, which information was obtained from J.
Foster Winans, a Journal reporter and co-conspirator who had written these columns. They argued in their defense that they had not deprived the Journal of anything of economic value,
because they had not informed the Journal's competitors or deprived it of the value inherent in
first publication. In the above quotation, the Court dismissed these arguments, replying in effect
that no economic loss need be shown when there is a deprivation of a property right.
8. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). As this Article goes to press, the impact of McNa/ly appears to
have been substantially reversed b;. the passage of a new statute in October, 1988, which defines
the term "scheme to defraud" to include "a scheme or artifice to defraud another of the intangihle rights of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 ("Definition of 'scheme or artifice' "}. Essen-
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like growth of the mail and wire fraud statutes. More important than all these
considerations, however, is the fact that Carpenter's logic has the potential to
alter significantly the relationship between employers and employees across the
landscape of American business life.
More than any other theory that the Court could have chosen to address
the evil of insider trading, Carpenter's doctrinal invention-the idea that divulging confidential information of one's employer amounts to embezzlementhas the ability to chill employee mobility and increase the social control that
employers have over employees. To see this, consider the case of an employee
whose position may be legally indistinguishable from that of Foster Winans,
the principal defendant in Carpenter, but in which the equities are very different: a broker at a major securities firm is fired because of low sales volume
and told that, pursuant to the firm's long-standing policy, he may not take
with him any list or address book listing his clients, as such information is a
trade secret belonging to the firm. 9 As a practical matter, if this broker cannot contact his former clients, he is unemployable with other firms and forfeits valuable "human capital" that he may have developed over a career.
Nevertheless, it is clear as a civil law matter that customer lists are confidential trade secrets. To criminalize this civil law rule then effectively arms the
employer with a weapon that the legislature never intended to grant it by importing a covenant not to compete, which would ordinarily be unenforceable,
into the employment contract.
Why, then, has there been relatively little commentary or outcry with regard
to this aspect of Carpenter? The probable answer is that insider trading has
long been the exclµsive province of the corporate and securities bar, within
which there is a broad consensus that the conduct of Foster Winans was egregious and rightfully branded as criminal. This author shares those views and
entertains no doubt about the need for a criminal prohibition on insider trading. However, the point that has largely escaped the corporate bar's attention
is that the Carpenter theory of liability vastly transcends the context of insider
trading and covers all forms of confidential business information, including, it
seems, any release of such information in violation of the fiduciary obligations
established by the law of agency. It is as if the Supreme Court, faced with a
narrow legal problem in the law of insider trading that could have been covered with a legal handkerchief, chose instead to drape a football field-sized
tially, this definition appears to eliminate the need for a property loss and so aggravates the
problem of overcriminalization discussed in this Article.
9. For reports that brokers are often dismissed in exactly the peremptory manner indicated in
this hypothetical (and their clients taken over by the firm), see Swartz, Crash Victims: SmallInvestor Brokers Lose Clients, Income in Wake of Oct. 19, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1988, at 1, col.
6. For cases holding that customer lists belong to the firm as a trade secret, see First Commodity
Co. of Boston v. Stanley, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Webcraft Technology, Inc.
v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Scheduling Corp. of Am. v. Massello, 456
N.E.2d 298 (Ill. 1983); see also People v. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573, 57S
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1%3) (upholding theft conviction for the taking of a copy of a customer
list).
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blanket over it. The question thus posed, however, is whether (or to what
extent) we wish to criminalize the law of agency.
At this point, we come full circle back to the topic of overcriminalization
and its relevance to '_'economic" or "regulatory" crimes. This theme was first
seriously examined by academics in the wake of the antitrust scandals of the
early 1960's, but it now stands in serious need of re-examination in light of
the current insider trading controversy. Indeed, the concept of "overcriminalization" is far from a neutral one. Those academics who in the 1960's questioned the utility of the criminal law as a mechanism for enforcing economic
regulations were sharply attacked by others who argued that the criminal law
both reflects and shapes a society's morality. 10 These critics argued in essence
that the public learns what is criminal from what is prosecuted. If so, this
interactive relationship between the criminal law and public morality means
that both law and morality shape each other. Thus, placing the sphere of economic regulation off limits to the criminal law might both produce a classbiased body of law and deny regulators one of the most effective weapons for
reshaping society's consciousness. Much in the recent insider trading scandals
reinforces this view of the educational power of the criminal law, as the public's perception of insider trading as truly criminal behavior appears to have
intensified in the wake of the Boesky revelations.
·
Clearly then, both sides in this debate can make persuasive arguments for
their position. This implies that we should focus more closely on identifying
the root evil that lies in overcriminalization. To do so, this Article will seek to
use our recent experience with insider trading and the criminal law's response
as a prism through which to examine the issue of overcriminalization in
sharper relief. The Article proceeds in three steps. First, Part I examines in
more detail both Carpenter and the modern law on mail and wire fraud, as it
has been reshaped by, and following, McNally v. United States. Part II then
searches for restraining principles by which to limit the further expansion of
the Carpenter theory of liability before it reaches the full limits of its dubious
logic. Finally. Part III returns to the topic of overcriminalization and the enduring issue of the degree to which the criminal law should overlap with our
public morality. It suggests at least a partial rationale for the widely shared
belief that there are some forms of misconduct that should be subject to civil,
but not criminal, sanctions.
I.

PHOENIX FROM THE AsHEs:

THE

DEATH AND REBIRTH ·oF INTANGIBLE

INTERESTS AS A BASIS FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY

To understand Carpenter's significance, one must begin with the law of mail
and wire fraud as is had evolved prior to June, 1987. In both the public and
10. See Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 UCLA L. REv. 694 (1972); Ball &
Friedrran, The f!se of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197 (1965). The Ball and Friedman article appears to have been a
response to earlier critics who had expressed skepticism about the use of the criminal sanction to
,,force economic regulations. These skeptical views were most clearly articulated in Kadish, supra
4; see also infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing Ball and Friedman approach).
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private fiduciary context, the theory had become widely accepted that any undisclosed breach of the duty of loyalty deprived an employer (or other beneficiary) of its right to an employee's "honest and faithful" services. 11 At its
high water mark, this doctrine had permitted the conviction of corporate employee§ who had established slush funds (in one case following the express
instructions of their superiors) 12 to facilitate off-the-books payments, even
though there was no evidence of diversion or personal benefit. The mere existence of undisclosed "corporate improprieties" was held sufficient to support
criminal liability, even in the absence of a true conflict of interest. As a result, the mail and wire fraud statutes had been effectively transformed from
simple prohibitions on fraud into statutes that mandated the public disclosure
of all material conflicts of interest and created the new crime of engaging in
corporate "improprieties." 13
I 1. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F .2d I 08 (2d Cir. 1982) (failure by political
party leader to disclose that appointment of insurance agency as broker of record for county was
motivated by secret agreement to kickback political contributions to party breached duty to provide honest and loyal services to public), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty to firm's client resulting from
conflict of interest violated mail fraud statute), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v.
Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure to disclose employee's hidden interest in borrower), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.),
aff'd on rehearing, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980)
(failure by governor and others to disclose material information concerning state-regulated enterprises defrauded citizens of their right to honest and faithful execution of duties by the governor);
United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (failure of city employee to disclose interest
in company awarded municipal contracts), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
As applied to public officials, the intangible rights doctrine can be traced back to Shushan v.
United States, 117 F.2d ll0, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). Some pre-McNal/y
decisions did not even bother to define the intangible right at issue, but simply said that the mail
and wire fraud statutes condemned "conduct which fails to match the reflection of moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members
of society." Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967).
The mail and wire fraud statutes are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). For a careful
review of their origins and early development, see Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part
/), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771 (1980).
12. See United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.) (Assistant Treasurer of Warner Communications convicted for helping to establish off-books slush fund at direction of corporate superiors, even though no evidence was presented of diversion of funds for personal or illegal
purposes), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). Although the Weiss court said that the jury could
have inferred that the funds were being diverted for a "non-corporate purpose", id. at 785, it did
not mean by this that the jury concluded that the defendant was personally benefitting, but only
that there was some sort of impropriety in progress. See United States v. Siegel, 717 F .2d 9 (2d
Cir. 1983) (breach of fiduciary duty and failure to disclose material information to the company
and its stockholders may, of itself, violate mail and wire fraud statutes).
13. In dissent in Siegel, Judge Winter wrote:
By allowing an inference of diversion to personal use to be drawn solely from the
lack of proper records, the majority has in effect dropped the element of a scheme
to defraud from the offense. . . . In effect, a new crime-corporate improprietieswhich entails neither fraud, nor even a victim, has been created.
United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit in Weiss for-
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In the public fiduciary context, even individuals who did not hold public
office but who had de facto control over governmental decisions (such as
party bosses) were convicted of mail or wire fraud, where they had engineered
the appointment of others to office, based on undisclosed political considerations.14 Although bribes or kickbacks were present in many (but not all) 15 of
these cases, the rationale of these cases required no such payment, but only
that there be some conduct motivated by an undisclosed conflict of interest.
This expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes came, however, to a
screeching halt in June, 1987, when the Supreme Court found in McNally v.
United States that both statutes covered only deprivations of money or property and thus could not reach an alleged scheme to deprive citizens for their
asserted rights to the honest and faithful services of their governmental officials. 16 Factually, McNa/Jy was indistinguishable from several earlier cases that
had been successfully prosecuted: public and political officials in Kentucky, including the Chairman of the State Democratic Party, had devised a scheme
under which one insurance brokerage agency would continue to purchase specified kinds of insurance for the state in return for its agreement to kickback a
percentage of its commissions to other agencies designated by the defendants,
including one in which one of them held a hidden interest. 17 No financial loss
to the state was alleged from this scheme. Because the critical language jn 18
U.S.C. Section 1341 refers to "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or frauduient pretenses, represenmulated a general rule that "evidence of a non-corporate purpose, explicitly or implicitly derived,
will satisfy the requirements of Siegel." United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d at 784. In short, if there
appears to be a suspicious-or, more euphemistically, a "non-corporate"-purpose, the fact-finder
may assume that funds were being fraudulently diverted from the corporation. This legal fiction
seems particularly dubious in light of the history of most slush funds and questionable payments,
which suggests that they were usually used to bribe third parties for a corporate purpose. Read
literally, it might also criminalize the act of a chief executive in making a charitable contribution
without disclosure, unless he can clearly prove the contribution was made for a "corporate purpose."
14. See United States v. Margiotta, 608 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983).
15. In United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), afj'd on rehean·ng, 602 F.2d 653
(4th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), the Fourth Circuit upheld the submission to the jury of alternative theories that either Governor Mandel had been bribed or that
"false information was presented to, or true information concealed from, the Maryland General
Assembly . . . in order to induce ... favorable action toward those interested in [the racetrack
involved in the scheme)." Id. at 1364. No proof was advanced that the Governor "had a direct
interest in the racetrack business." Id. As I have suggested elsewhere, this latter theory that one
commits fraud by failing to disclose all material information when one's friends are involved
reaches well beyond the traditional crime of bribery to cover also the "the sin of cronyism." See
Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and
the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. ClllM. L. REv. ll7, 143 (1981).
16. McNally v. United States, 107 S. a. 2875 (1987).
17. The faw. of McNal/y are n0t 'ignificantly different from those in United States v. Mar,iiotta, supra note 11, in which the conviction of the Chairman of the Republican Party of Nassau
'ounty, New York was upheld.
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tations or promises," the prosecution obviously felt that this disjunctive
phrasing made it unnecessary to allege any property loss; the first clause
seemed to imply that there could be some "schemes to defraud" that were not
for the purpose of "obtaining money or property." A seven-justice majority
disagreed, however, finding both the legislative history of Section 1341 and the
common meaning of the words "to defraud" required that the defendant
wrong another "in his property rights." 18
The McNally opinion is dry, technical, and largely focused on the sparse
legislative history of Section 1341. Only when one reaches the dissent does one
learn that, in rejecting the intangible rights theory, the majority was departing
from a rule that all the lower courts that had construed Section 1341 had
"uniformly and consistently" followed. 19
The McNal/y decision seemed then to vindicate-implicitly, but never explicitly-the view that several commentators and some dissenting judges had begun to articulate in the early 1980's: that the "intangible rights" doctrine had
resulted in a serious overextension of the criminal law, one that left no meaningful line between the civil law of fiduciary duties and the criminal law of
fraud. 20 Because the term "fiduciary" essentially implies only a relationship
based on trust and confidence {rather than one based on a market exchange), 21
an interpretation that criminalizes all undisclosed fiduciary breaches seemingly
gave the mail and wire fraud statutes a nearly universal scope.
Yet, if the McNal/y Court intended to limit the reach of the mail and wire
fraud statutes out of a civil libertarian concern about overcriminalization, it
did a remarkably half-baked job. The problem is that a broadly expansive
definition can be given to the elusive concept of "property." Indeed, Justice
Stevens' dissent vividly illustrates just how plastic the concept is, because in a
subversively clever footnote he points out that, under standard agency law
principles, the principal is entitled to anything that the agent receives as a
18. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 (citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265
U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
19. Id. at 2884. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
20. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 15; Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing
Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I (1983); Hurson,
Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 423
(1983); Comment, The Intangible Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions Under the
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 562 (1980).
21. At common law, a fiduciary relationship arises "when there is special confidence reposed
in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to
[the] interests of [the] one reposing the confidence." BLACK'S LAW D1cnoNARY 563-64 (5th ed.
1979). For decisions adopting this formula, see Cheese Shop Int'l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 689,
691 (Del. 1973); In re Heilman's Estate, 37 Ill. App. 3d 390, 396, 345 N.E.2d 536, 540 (App. Ct.
1976); Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 191 Ga. 821, 841, 14 S.E.2d 64, 76
(1941); Miarnovitz v. Gee, 163 Wisc. 246, 252, 157 N.W. 790, 792 (1916). See also Coffee, supra
note 15, at 150-51.
In Margiotta, the Second Circuit adopted a "reliance" and "de facto" control test to determine
whether a fiduciary relationship existed, thereby converting those with control over governmental
decisions into fiduciaries. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 122 (citing this author).
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result of the latter's violation of a duty of loyalty. 22 In short, the ill-gotten
gain is the property of the principal. Thus, if an agent receives a bribe, the
principal, being entitled to this amount, can be said to have been defrauded
by the agent's failure to disclose and surrender it. So viewed, the property loss
requirement in McNa/ly nearly evaporates, shrinking from a bulwark against
prosecutorial overzealousness to simply a pleading rule. In effect, the mail and
wire fraud statutes become a Federal Anti-Kickback Act, and even the defendants in McNally coqld presumably be convicted on a re-framed indictment.
Within months after McNa/ly was decided, several circuits had adopted
Justice Stevens' reasoning, convicting employees who received kickbacks without any showing of an economic loss. 23 For example, in United States v. Runnels, 24 it seems unlikely that there was any economic loss caused by the
agent's misbehavior. A union official took kickbacks from law firms to whom
he referred workmen's compensation cases brought to him by his union members. Because the fees that the law firms would receive were set by a state
agency, it is doubtful that the agent's gain came at the union members' expense. Yet because there was a fiduciary breach in this situation, the Sixth
Circuit upheld the conviction on the ground that the kickbacks belonged under
agency law to either the union or its members. In anoth~r Fifth Circuit case,
the conviction of an employee who took a bribe was upheld, even though the
court acknowledged that his corporate employer had suffered no tangible economic loss, but rather had only suffered an injury to its reputation and goodwill.2s
22. Justice Stevens stated:
When a person is being paid a salary for his loyal services, any breach of that loyalty would appear to carry with it some loss of money to the employer-who is not
getting what he paid for. Additionally, "fi)f an agent receives anything as a result of
his violation of a duty of loyalty to the principal, he is subject to a liability to
deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, to the principal." Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 403 (1958). This duty may fulfill the Court's money. or property requirement in most kickback schemes.
McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. at 2890 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting.)
23. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Matt,
838 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 114S (5th Cir. 1987).
24. 833 F .2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987).
25. In United States v. RICO Industries, Inc., 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12347 (5th Cir. 1988),
the purchasing agent of a public utility received a bribe, but the utility nonetheless received the
maximum profit permitted by Jaw because it passed its costs through to its customers. Defendants
thus argued that the utility could not have been defrauded because it could not have legally received any greater profit. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found that, if disclosure had been made
by the agent, the utility could have purchased and resold at lower prices, thereby increasing its
goodwill and fulfilling "its duty as a public utility." This raises a question likely to recur: can
injury to reputation or goodwill suffice to meet the property test of McNally? If it can, then at a
minimum the Court wasted its tim" st1:-:ing to characterize Winans' conduct in Carpenter as embezzlement; it could simply have asserted that he had injured the Wall Street Journars reputation
•nd goodwill. Ultimately, the problem with intangible injuries to goodwill as a basis for criminal
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Actually, Justice Stevens' theory of property reaches well beyond the case
where the agent or employee receives a bribe. As he explains it, his theory
would reach any act of disloyalty on the ground that there is a failure of
consideration: ''When a person is paid a salary for his loyal services, any
breach of that loyalty would appear to carry with it some loss of money to
the employer-who is not getting what he paid for. " 26 The problem with this
expansive theory is not its logic, but its overbreadth. Under it, an employee
who calls in sick in order to go to a ball game has seemingly defrauded his
employer of the value of his services for that day (and thereby comes within
the statute's reach if the call is made over an interstate telephone line). Similarly, an employee in a supermarket who receives a five dollar tip for reserving a choice cut of meat for a customer has defrauded the employer out of its
property interest in this tip, even though there is no economic loss because the
supermarket would not raise its price. 27
Such examples reveal a fundamental problem with these statutes: unlike
many other federal criminal statutes, they include no concept of a de minimis
violation. All that keeps a trivial act of disloyalty from being deemed a federal felony is the tender mercy of the federal prosecutor-who sometimes has
his own reasons to pursue small or technical violations. In addition, these examples underscore the separation of powers and federalism issues in an expansionist judicial approach to defining criminal liability. The courts, and not the
legislature, have made the judgment to expand these statutes, and they have
done so in situations where it is doubtful that the Congress would want the
federal criminal law to apply, as in either of the foregoing cases. Moreover, rarely, if ever, has federal law stretched a concept-here, the nature of
the property subject to theft-in a manner so completely in conflict with the
narrower and more careful development of the same concept at the state
level.28 Yet, the justification for such an expansive federal approach-that the
mails or interstate wires were used-is largely fictional.
Today, footnote ten of Justice Stevens' dissent hovers, like Banquo's ghost,
over the contemporary law of mail fraud, and few conclusions can be expressed that are not subject to the uncertainty that it creates. Already, there is
liability is that their legitimation effectively turns the mail fraud statute into a criminal libel statute. See Note, Moil Fraud and Free Speech, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 942 (1986) (arguing that criminal
libel is constitutional only when there is proof of incitement to violence or disruption).
26. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. at 2980 n.10.
27. Of course, to violate the mail or wire fraud statutes, the requisite instrumentality-either
the mails or interstate wires-would have to be used. Still, if the tipper paid by check and the
check cleared between the paying and recipient banks through the mails, this would probably suffice; courts have found such a minimal contact with the mails sufficient to support a conviction.
See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) (bank's transmittal of check for collection
was sufficient because success of scheme "depended upon the bank collection processes"), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). Alternatively, an interstate telephone call by either party would support use of the wire fraud statute.
28. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (noting that intangible property interests were
never subject to theft).
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a split among the circuits as to whether to accept its theory that any bribe
"defrauds" the employer. 29 Justice Stevens' roadmap for nullifying McNally's
property loss requirement is, however, only one of two routes to this end. The
other was supplied by a unanimous Court later that same year. Having established the property loss requirement as a prerequisite of mail fraud in June,
1987, the Court waited only until December, 1987, to inflate its concept of
property in Carpenter in a manner that trivializes McNa/ly by making it likely
that a property loss 'Yill be found in most cases when an employee acts based
on a conflict of interest.
In Carpenter, the Court took two important doctrinal steps. First, it recognized that there can be intangible forms of property, of which a victim may
be defrauded. 30 This seems an obvious conclusion, as one can imagine many
valuable forms of intangible property: for example, patents, copyrights, contract rights, etc. Second, it found that one form of intangible property, confidential business information, is embezzled whenever an employee reveals it to
others so as to deprive the employer of exclusive possession. 31
In contrast to this unremarkable first step, the second step is extraordinary,
because it eliminates any need for a showing of actual or intended economic
injury to ~he employer. Such a holding was essential to the outcome in Carpenter, because the conduct of the principal defendant, Foster Winans, probably involved at most a reputational injury to his employer, The Wall Street
Journal. As the reporter who wrote the Journal's widely followed "Heard on
the Street" column, Winans revealed in advance the generic contents of his
columns to co-conspirators who traded profitably on the small, but predictable, market reactions its publication caused. This conduct, however, caused no
economic injury to the Journal, both because it had no interest in these securities and because the information was not revealed to any of its competitors
who could publish it. Although the defendants argued that "they did not in29. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits appear to agree that any kickback constitutes a property loss
sufficient to support a mail or wire fraud conviction. See United States v. Runnels and United
States v. Richerson, supra note 23. Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected this
broad theory. See United States v. Ward, 1988 U.S. App. Lexis 6186 (7th Cir. 1988) (attorney
who paid bribe to obtain lenient sentence for client did not deprive state of property interest);
United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988) (state trial judge's receipt of bribe did not
violate mail fraud statute absent some other showing that a party lost money or property as result). The Second Circuit seems to agree with the Seventh Circuit, although its leading decision is
less explicit. See United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1988) (bribe paid to private employee insufficient to show deprivation of property).
30. Carpenter v. United States, l 08 S. Ct. at 320 ("Confidential business information has long
been recognized as property.").
31. The Court stated:
The Journal had a property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use,
prior to publication, of the schedule and contents of the "Heard" columns ....
The concept of "fraud" includes the act of embezzlement, which is the fraudulent
appropria,ion to one's own use :if the money or goods entrusted to one's care by
another.
1rpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 320-21 (citing Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)).
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terfere with the Journal's use of the information [and] did not publicize it and
deprive the Journal of the first public use of it," 32 the Court refused to be
limited by any requirement of economic injury. Instead, it adopted a property
rights analysis:
It is sufficient that the Journal has been deprived of its right to
exclusive use of the information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business information and most private property
for that matter. . . . The concept of "fraud" includes the act of
embezzlement, which is the "fraudulent appropriation" to one's
own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by another.33
Taken literally, this is a wildly overinclusive theory. Under it, a reporter
who tells a spouse or a friend the contents of his next day's column deprives
the employer of its exclusive use, even though the friend has no interest, and
does not trade, in the securities so recommended. 34 As will be discussed below,
it also rests on a flawed understanding of the crime of embezzlement and a
general ignorance of attempts to deal with the problem of trade secrets both
in the common law and statutory law.
However, the immediate question is why the Court reached this novel result,
given the distaste it showed in McNa/ly for creative expansion of penal statutes. My answer is that it probably saw greater problems with the SEC's
"misappropriation theory" of insider trading under Rule IOb-5, as applied to
Winans' situation, and sought to sidestep them by turning to mail fraud.
There were two basic weaknesses in the misappropriation theory as it was
extended to the unique case of Foster Winans. First, Winans had not received
material, non-public information from any of the companies he had interviewed, rather his only alleged "inside" information related to the timing and
contents of a newspaper article that was based entirely on lJUblicly available
information. 3s If Winans' relatively weak recommendation was material, so
might be the similar recommendation of any securities analyst. Second, the
Journal itself did not trade and hence could not have maintained a private
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. Of course, it would be a complete defense in such a case that the reporter lacked the
requisite mens rea, because both mail and wire fraud require a specific intent to defraud. See
United States v. Von Bana, 635 F.2d 999, 1005 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Diggs, 613
F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (proof of specific intent critical because scheme is all that need be
shown), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). Also, use of the requisite instrumentality-mails or
interstate wires-would have to be demonstrated.
3S. As indicated in the district court opinion, the government's theory was that Winans "misappropriated a certain type of market-sensitive information-the nature and timing of Wall Street
Journal articles." United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). It appears to
have been conceded by all parties in the case that The Wall Street Journal could have traded on
this same information, thus implying the Journal did not possess material "inside information."
Id. at 840 & n.6.
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action for damages against Winans under Rule l0b-5. 36 Nor could injured
investors who had traded successfully sue under that Rule because Winans did
not owe them any fiduciary duty. 37
In short, something may have seemed amiss to at least some of the Justices
with a theory of liability founded on Rule lOb-5 that asserted Winans had
defrauded someone, but recognized no one as an injured victim entitled to
sue. More generally, the Court may have viewed the real dispute as simply
one between an employer and employee and thus too remote from the securities markets to justify stretching Rule l0b-5 to protect an employer's interest
in maintaining the confidentiality of proprietary information. Although a better theory might have been pleaded under Rule l0b-5 that could have justified
imposing criminal liability with less sophistry, 38 under the misappropriation
theory it is difficult to explain how the Journal, as the putative victim, has
experienced securities fraud.
Yet the upshot of the Court's decision to rely on mail fraud is clear: having
buried the "intangible rights" theory in June, the Court resurrected an "intangible property" theory in December. One suspects that today a creative
prosecutor will be able to find intangible property that has been "embezzled"
in many of the same contexts where he had formerly found an "intangible
right" that had been violated. Of course, the tendency for hard cases to. make
bad law is not a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, to understand how significant
a departure Carpenter is from the prior criminal law applicable to trade secrets, this section will examine (a) the prior case law, (b) modern statutory
developments, and (c) some applications of Carpenter and McNally that are
virtually certain to arise in future cases.

A. Information as Property: The Prior Case Law
On a few occasions in the past, mail and wire fraud statutes have been used
to prosecute cases where what was involved was essentially the theft of trade
36. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975). Only a purchaser or
seller of securities may maintain an action for damages based on Rule l0b-5.
37. Under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983), one must disclose material, nonpublic
information before trading only if one owes a duty to the other trading party. Dirks required that
there be a "specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information." Id. at 655. Because no corporate insider of any firm analyzed by Winans breached
a duty to his shareholders, and because Winans was not a "constructive insider" of any of these
firms, Winans did not owe any duty, directly or indirectly, to shareholders of any firm whose
stock he analyzed. His only obligations were to his employer, The Wall Street Journal.
38. The government might have reached Winans under the "touting" or "scalping" theory
used in Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975). In Zweig, a financial columnist for
the Los Angeles Herald Examiner touted stocks in his column that he had earlier purchased. His
failure to disclose his personal interest in these securities was seen as making his recommendations
of them misleading in the context in which his statements were made, thus violating Rule I0b-5.
The difference between this theory and that of Carpenter is that under Zweig the prosecution
would focus on the statements Winans did make, not on his total failure to disclose. Rule lOb-5
covers much more than simply insider trading (which essentially involves an omission) and applies
generally to all knowing misstatements, whether or not made by an "insider" under Dirks. Under
•r~ig, it would be irrelevant whether Winans owed anyone a fiduciary duty.
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secrets. 39 An illustrative example is Abbott v. United States,4-0 in which the
defendant, an oil investor, was convicted of using the mails to defraud by
mailing payments to an oil company employee who supplied defendant with
illicit copies of geophysical maps. In United States v. Newman, 41 the Second
Circuit upheld a conviction both on mail fraud and securities fraud counts
where a group of young investment bankers traded on their advance knowledge of takeover targets gained from their firm's clients.
What distinguishes these cases from Carpenter? In Abbott, the economic
harm is clear, and in Newman, the Second Circuit emphasized that insider
trading before the announcement of a tender offer raises the premium that the
bidder must pay. 42 Accordingly, the fiduciary breach increased the bidder's total acquisition cost. Thus, even before McNal/y, courts in this area did not
rely on the fiduciary breach alone in upholding convictions involving trade secrets, but rather stressed the existence of some actual economic harm. Carpenter makes a unique and dubious contribution to the law in appearing to hold
there can be a property loss without an economic loss. To be sure, the law of
fraud would be satisfied with proof of a potential loss (because mail and wire
fraud are inchoate crimes},43 but not even a potential economic loss was asserted in Carpenter. 44
39. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, 722
F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542, 544-45
(5th Cir. 1979) (fraudulent scheme by employees to acquire and lease oil company's property dependent on use of mails); United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 1978) (jury found
computer software to be "property" and attempt by unauthorized employee to obtain it violative
of wire fraud statutes); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir.) (deceitful
attempt to obtain confidential information from telephone company and United States Post Office
prosecutable under mail fraud statutes), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
40. 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956). In Abbott, the court found that the employer had suffered
real economic loss, because "[i]t had at great expense, for its own proper u•e, undertaken geophysical surveys and prepared maps reflecting the information gathered and evaluated by trained
scientists." Id. at 314 (footnote omitted). The court also described the maps as "of almost inestimable practical value" for an oil exploration company. Id. Abbott does resemble Carpenter in
that at bottom the defendant injured his employer by depriving it of the "rightful exclusive enjoyment" of the information, but the information misappropriated in Abbott was clearly being directed to a competitor, and thus much more than reputational injury was at stake.
41. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 17-18.
43. The mail and wire fraud statutes require only that there be a "scheme to defraud" and a
use of the mails or wires in furtherance thereof. Thus, as with the crimes of attempts and conspiracy, fruition of the scheme is not necessary. All that must be shown is that "some harm or
injury was contemplated by the alleged scheme." United States v. London, 753 F.2d 202, 206 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
44. The district court in Winans made it quite clear that the injury caused by Winans' trading
was reputational in character: "The harm suffered was an alleged reputational injury; as a result
of having a reporter engaged in such unethical conduct, the Wall Street Journafs reputation for
journalistic integrity was sullied." United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 845. The district
court refused to consider whether reputational harm had in fact resulted on the ground that it
was sufficient to sustain the conviction that it was contemplated. Id. Of course, this injury would
occur only if the scheme failed (as in United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 99') (2d Cir. 1980)).
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The Carpenter decision is also a marked departure from prior law in its
casual assertion that depriving the owner of exclusive possession of information amounts to an embezzlement. The history of embezzlement and the law
of theft is long and tortuous, but one historical fact is clear beyond serious
argument: intangibles could not be stolen or embezzled.•s Rather, theft offenses had to involve tangible personal property. Despite the obvious importance
of information in today's high-tech, post-industrial economy, the modern cases
prior to Carpenter seem to have faithfully abided by this· rule. In Commonwealth v. Engleman,'46 an important 1957 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, defendants had been convicted by the trial court for conspiring
to steal trade secrets used in the construction of jewelry b9xes. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed these convictions, ruling that trade secrets could
not be the subject of larceny, either at common law or under the Massachusetts statute. In general, state prosecutions involving the conversion of trade
secrets have been rare and have usually been based on (1) specific tangible
documents that were removed, (2) commercial bribery statutes, or (3) special
statutes primarily aimed at the protection of computer data. 47 Thus, prior to
Carpenter, the transfer of confidential information was not viewed as within
the scope of the criminal law, unless a bribe or some theft of tangible property that memorialized the trade secret was involved.
More importantly, if reputational injury suffices, any actionable slander or libel sent through the
mail or uttered over interstate wires is criminalized-again, a quantum leap in the extension of the
statute. See supra note 25.
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Carpenter wisely shifted the focus away from reputational
injury as a basis for criminal liability, but it also explicitly rejected the assertion "that a scheme
to defraud requires a monetary loss, such as giving the information to a competitor.'' Carpenter
v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 321. Thus, above all, Carpenter stands for the highly debatable
idea that there can be a property loss without an economic loss.
45. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 633-37 (1972) ("At common law, one could
not steal intangible personal property."}.
46. 142 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1957).
47. For example, in State v. Telek, 90 N.J. Super. 61, 216 A.2d 242 (1966), the court sidestepped the issue of whether trade secrets belonging to Merck & Co., Inc., could be embezzled,
and found instead that specific documents were taken. Similarly, in State v. Landecker, 126 A.
408 (N.J. 1924), a commercial bribery statute was used to reach the misappropriation of a trade
secret. This result seems acceptable because individuals have long been on notice that bribery is
criminal and can thus avoid entanglement with the criminal law.
Several courts in California have found that the transfer of a customer list amounts to theft.
See, e.g., People v. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573, 575 (1st Dist. 1963};
People v. Parker, 217 Cal. App. 2d 422, 31 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719-20 (2d Dist. 1963). While uncertainty is likely to exist as to whom the list belongs (for example, to the salesperson or to the
firm), such cases are at least consistent with the federal case law under the National Stolen Property Act. See infra note 48. For a case finding computer programs to be property, see Hancock v.
State, 402 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Texas Crim. App. 1966).
For the overall assessment that "the misappropriating party has not normally been exposed to
criminal liability for wrongfully taking a trade secret," see Annotation, Criminal Liability for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 84 A.L.R. 3o 967, 971 (1978). For a review of state statutes and
decisions, see Epstein, Criminal Liability for the Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, in MILGRIM
'.>N TRADE SECRETS app. B-5 (1979).
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At the federal level, convictions for conduct that essentially involved the
theft of trade secrets have occasionally been obtained under the National Stolen Property Act, but the court has always found some tangible item that was
transported across a state line and in which the trade secret was physically
contained. Nor was this a fortuitous fact. In United States v. Bottone, 48 the
Second Circuit explicitly acknowledged the need for a transported physical object to support a theft conviction under the Act:
Where no tangible objects were ever taken or transported, a court
would be hard-pressed to conclude that 'goods' had been stolen and
transported within the meaning of [18 U.S.C. § 2311]; the statute
would presumably not extend in the case where a carefully guarded
secret was memorized, carried away in the recesses of a thievish
mind and placed in writing only after [state lines] had been
crossed. 49
Besides the rule that the crime of theft applied only to tangible personal
property, the common law also imposed the additional requirements that there
be a "caption" and an "asportation"-namely, a physical seizure and carrying
away of objects. so Far from abandoning this ancient rule, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed it in 1985 by interpreting the National Stolen Property Act "clearly
to contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and
those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods. »si In short, copying of a trade secret (either by photographic reproduction or by duplicating computer software) did not automatically amount
to theft, at least for the purposes of the federal criminal law.s2 Today, these
rules may seem out-of-date relics, but in their time they served the understandable purpose of assuring that the criminal law would be applied only in
48. 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1966). The court in Bottone found that
transporting a physical copy of the stolen formula across state lines did violate the National Stolen Property Act. Id. at 393-94. For other cases upholding use of the National Stolen Property
Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2311 et. seq.) to prosecute the theft of trade secrets where some physical object
was transported across a state line, see United States v. Greenwald, 479 F .2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973)
(documents containing confidential chemical formula transported); United States v. Seagraves, 265
F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959) (stolen geophysical maps transported).
49. United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d at 393.
50. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 45, at 631-33 (discussion of "taking" and "carrying away" required for crime of larceny).
51. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985) (emphasis added). The Court held in
this case that the "bootlegging" of phonograph records did not fall within the Act, although the
music had been misappropriated, because nothing had been transported across state lines in a
manner that satisfied the statute.
52. Some states have enacted statutes to close this loophole. New York has dual statutes: one
forbidding the theft of narrowly specified kinds of trade secrets, and another forbidding their
unauthorized use. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.30(3) (stating that a person is guilty of grand
larceny when he steals "secret scientific material") and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07 (criminalizing
"unlawful use of secret scientific material").
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situations where the actor would unquestionably know that he was behaving in
a criminal fashion. 53

B.

Statutory Developments

Although the use of the criminal law to protect trade secrets and technology
has a long history,'4 it is sufficient for present purposes to note that most
states have moved only modestly and marginally over the last thirty-odd years
to modify the common law's rules as they applied to intangible property. Typically, state legislatures either recognized trade secrets as "property" in their
larceny statutes or enacted special statutes aimed exclusively at protecting trade
secrets or preventing computer fraud. 55 The common denominator in these statutes is the extreme care with which they define narrowly the kinds of information whose theft was criminalized. Because the locus of Foster Winans'
misconduct was New York, it is particularly relevant to look at the New York
statutory pattern. Under New York law, trade secrets or confidential information amount to "property" for purposes of the law of theft only when they
constitute "secret scientific material." This term is defined by Section 155.00(6)
of the New York Penal Law to mean:
a sample, culture, micro-organism, specimen, record,- recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substanc~
53. For a defense of the common law's refusal to treat information the same as other forms
of property for purposes of criminal liability, see Tigar, The Right of Property. and the Law of
Theft, 62 TEX L. REv. 1443 (1984).
54. See Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the Theft of Trade
Secrets, 25 Bus. LAW. 1S35 (1970) (describing English statutes from the 14th through 17th centuries prohibiting exportation of technical drawings, models and specifications and restricting mobility of skilled workers).
S5. New York adopted a highly limited definition of trade secrets in N.Y. PENAL LAW §
155.00(6) (McKinney 197S) (defining "secret scientific material"). See infra note 56 and accompanying text. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.30(3) (McKinney 1975) then makes such "secret scientific material" a form of property subject to theft. New Jersey has gone further than New York and
more broadly criminalized the theft of trade secrets, but even then requires that a tangible object
or "article" be taken by the defendant. N.J .S. CUM. SUPP. § 2A: 119-5.3. Also, the definition of
"trade secret" in the statute covers only "scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement which is secret and of value." N.J.S. CUM. SUPP. § 2A:119S.2(c}. Thus, the New Jersey law would similarly not reach a defendant such as Foster Winans,
who posessed no "scientific or technical information." California has adopted a definition of
"trade secret" which is nearly identical to New Jersey's, and thus would also not reach the conduct of Foster Winans. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(c) (West Ann. 1984).
Florida, however, has enacted a new statute that prohibits crimes against "intellectual property"
that could conceivably reach the conduct of a Foster Winans. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01 to
815.07 (West Supp. 1988). A number of states have recently amended their larceny statutes to
cover computer programs and data within their definition of property. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 150.00(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Recent state prosecutions, however, have been rare. But see
People v. Russo, 131 Misc. 2d 677, 501 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Suffolk County Ct. 1986) (denying motion
to dismiss indictment under New York law prohibiting unlawful use of secret scientific material);
People v. Gopal, 171 Cal. App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); People v.
Serrata, 62 Cal. App. 3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (affirming conviction for theft of trade
·ecrets).
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which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects, or records a scientific or technical process, invention or formula, or any part or
phase thereof, and which is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the person or persons rightfully in possession thereof or selected persons having access thereto with his or
their consent, and when it accords or may accord such rightful possessors an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not
have knowledge or the benefit thereof. 56
Under this definition, which requires cumulatively that the information (1)
have a scientific character, (2) have been kept secret, and (3) confer a commercial advantage, it seems beyond argument that the contents of Foster Winans' columns would not qualify. Moreover, at worst, theft of secret scientific
information can result in no more than a class E felony.
In 1979, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, which at least fifteen states have now enacted. Although
the definition of trade secret in this statute is quite broad, 57 no criminal penalties are authorized by it. Instead, the Act relies upon injunctions and damages
suits for its enforcement. Federal law-at least prior to Carpenter-also lacked
a generally applicable criminal provision relating to trade secrets. 58
56. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.30(3) makes it a lesser degree of grand larceny to steal property
where the property consists of "secret scientific material."
57. Section 1(4) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret to mean "information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process" that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of effort; that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain it secrecy.

Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1985).
At least fifteen states have adopted this statute, which, as of late 1986, does not provide for
criminal penalties. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.Ol to 325C.08 (1981 & West Supp.
1987); see also H.C. ANAUWALT, IDEAS IN THE WORKPLACE: PLANNING FOR PROTECTION 135
(1988).
58. A few federal criminal statutes protect against certain misappropriations of trade secrets,
but in a random, highly unsystematic way. The Federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1982), would reach disclosure by the government of trade secrets obtained by it from others. The
National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2318 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), could apply if a
tangible object is transported across a state line. Misappropriated computer data would sometimes
fall within the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. IV 1986). The federal
copyright law also contains a criminal provision, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982), but it applies only to
the copyrighted material and not the raw information contained therein; a similar provision is
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982), and provides for criminal prosecution of copyright violations
in connection with sound recordings and audio visual materials.
Thus, if an employee revealed a copyrighted blueprint to a competitor, or if Foster Winans
gave his actual columns to his co-conspirators, this statute might apply (although a brief summary
of the contents of the columns would probably not be covered). Finally, if the trade secret belonged to the government, 18 U.S.C. § 641 could apply. See infra note 67.
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Thus, Carpenter has criminalized an area that was only previously subject to
criminal penalties in a few cases involving (a) clear economic injury to the
employer, (b) the theft of accompanying tangible objects, or (c) the theft either of specially defined types of information (for example, government property or computer software), or under specially defined circumstances. 59 Indeed,
the scope of Carpenter is not even limited to trade secrets, which the common
law and some statutory law has defined, but applies generally to th~ vaguer
category of all confidential business information.
·
C.

The New Property: Some Applications

The fact that neither the common law of theft nor recent statutory developments have ever stated a principle as broad and unqualified as Carpenter's
off-handed assertion that the disclosure of confidential business information
amounts to embezzlement does not prove that such a rule is undesirable. After
all, what is wrong with such a rule in a high-tech economy where service industries account for an increasing share of our gross national product? The
answer emerges when we look at some fact patterns where the Carpenter principle may soon be applied. Let us begin with two examples recently culled
from the New York Times' business page:
First, following the 1987 acquisition of the brokerage firm E.F. Hutt(?n by
Shearson Lehman Brothers, other brokerage firms sought to lure away Hutton's most successful brokers. 60 Dean Witter Reynolds hired some eighty-two
Hutton brokers, and this raid resulted in litigation brought by Shearson and
Hutton to prevent Dean Witter from using any confidential information it
thereby obtained. For present purposes, the litigation between the two firms is
less interesting than the way it may be restyled in the future after Carpenter.
If we assume for the moment that customer lists are confidential business information, brokers at E.F. Hutton in the future could be sued (or simply
threatened with suit) for converting this information by denying Hutton its
59. At the federal level, the greatest threat of criminal liability before Carpenter came from
the National Stolen Property Act if tangible objects, such as notes or business records, were
transported across a state line. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Or, if the confidential information belonged to the government, 18 U.S.C. § 641 could be (and was) used on the
theory that government property was being converted. See infra note 67. Finally, even before Carpenter the mail fraud statute was sometimes employed, but only in cases involving clear economic
injury. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. No federal case prior to Carpenter seems,
however, to have upheld criminal liability on as tenuous a showing of injury to the employer.
At the state level, generalizations are harder to make. Most relevant statutes do not attempt to
reach all trade secrets, but, as with the New York statute, have a considerably narrower scope.
See supra note SS. There have been a few reported state prosecutions where the fact pattern essentially involved theft of a trade secret; typically, these prosecutions have been based either on a
commercial bribery statute where an employee was bribed or on a larceny statute where tangible
objects were also taken. See cases cited at note 47 supra; see also People v. Serrata, 62 Cal. App.
3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
60. See Cowan, "Poachers Lurk at Hutton's Door," N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1988, at DI, col.
I. For a similar account of raiding and high mobility among brokerage firms, see Swartz, note 9
···.'Jra.
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exclusive use. A private action could be brought based both on common law
principles for breach of fiduciary duty and on RICO (using mail and wire
fraud as the predicate felonies). If there is doubt as to whom the property
actually belonged (that is, the broker or the former firm), counsel for the firm
will predictably learn over time to rewrite their employee's manuals to make it
clear that the firm owns all customer lists and any other data about the customer's financial resources, investment preferences or financial goals. The manual might then add that all copies, extracts or other records based on such
data belonged to the employer and must be physically surrendered by the employee on the termination of his or her employment. Effective as these techniques may be for the employer, consider the' social desirability of their impact
on both the employee and the customer, immobilizing, as they do, the former
and often denying to the latter the services of his former agent.
A more recent and more , publicized example involved the mass defections
from Lord, Geller, Federico & Einstein, a subsidiary of a major British advertising conglomerate. The defectors, including six top executives of Lord, Geller
and· a total of thirty employees, left to form their own firm, Lord, Einstein &
Partners. 61 The mass move, which appears to have been a response to an
abrupt change in the corporate culture following the acquisition of Lord,
Geller by the British firm, resulted in iitigation that led to a New York State
court enjoining the departing partners from taking any steps to solicit clients
or personnel from their former firm. 62
If one assumes (as the state court apparently did) that such a mass decision
could not have occurred without some coordination and planning (much of it
no doubt covertly hidden from the parent firm), then again it follows that this
conduct amounted to an undisclosed fiduciary breach. Moreover, to the extent
that confidential data about the agency's principal customer (here, IBM) and
its marketing plans, advertising philosophy, and other preferences moved to
the new firm, it is again possible to argue that Carpenter's simple theory that
any deprivation of the employer's exclusive entitlement to confidential business
information amounts to embezzlement applies as much to this example as to
Winans' conduct in releasing the contents of his press columns. Indeed, in
both the foregoing cases, the likely financial loss to the employer is greater
than was the predictable loss (if any) to The Wall Street Journal.
Both the foregoing illustrations underscore the possibility that Carpenter will
effect a significant reallocation of social control between employer and employee in favor of the former. The danger that this balance will shift is most
acute in service industries, such as law, investment banking, medicine, advertising and other consulting businesses. Where previously these same disputes
resulted in civil litigation, today there is the prospect of treble damages litigation (under RICO) and criminal indictments. 63 In fact, the potential for private
61. See Dougherty, "Lord and Einstein Ordered Not to Recruit Old Clients," N.Y. Times,
Apr. 6, 1988, at D1, col. 1.
62. Id.
63. Private actions for treble damages under the RICO statute are authorized by 18 U.S.C. §
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RICO litigation to expand the content of the mail fraud statute by creating
precedents that will automatically be carried over to criminal contexts is without precedent and potentially dangerous. Courts will be adopting rules of law
in situations where they intend only to shift losses and assign damages, and
these same holdings will subject others to a potential loss of liberty. Finally,
even if indictments are unlikely in employer/employee disputes, an employer's
threat to invoke the criminal law may still have a chilling, if not visible, impact.
The point here is n"ot just that civil wrongs are being casually converted into
criminal offenses, but that the equivalent of a covenant not to compete is
being created by operation of law. Because the law today. favors competition,
such covenants are disfavored and generally enforceable only if they have a
brief duration and limited scope. 64 However, if Carpenter's logic is taken to
mean that, in order to avoid potential entanglement with the criminal law, the
employee cannot use his former customer lists or must desist from using any
particularized knowledge about his customers that he gained in his former employment, then Carpenter has given the employer a very powerful weapon to
stifle competition, one that does not even require that the employee sign a
binding covenant.
.
A third illustration raises an even darker prospect: what would happen to
the whistleblower under Carpenter? Suppose a corporate employee reveals to
the press that internal corporate studies show some serious environmental consequence of a specific corporate activity. However noble the motive for this
employee's conduct, good motives do not excuse embezzlement. 65 Under Carpenter's logic, the employee is arguably in the same position as if he stole
corporate funds to aid a worthy cause.
Alternatively, a governmental employee could conceivably be prosecuted for
leaking confidential information to the press-a result that would convert the
1964(c) (1982) and may be brought by "any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation" of the statute.
64. E.g., Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., Inc. v. A-I-A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 398
N.Y.S.2d 1004, 396 N.E.2d 4 (1977); Solar Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 264 A.2d 53
(1970).
65. Cf. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.Y. v. de Wit, 415 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.),
modified and afj'd, 418 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1st. Dept. 1979) (court may enjoin "whistleblower" who is
about to disclose information that includes trade secrets). The employee might be able to defend
on the grounds that he lacked any specific intent to defraud, but this is highly debatable because
the actus reus of the crime is depriving the employer of exclusive possession of the information,
which the employee probably recognizes he is doing.
Another possible escape clause is a phrase in Carpenter that stipulates that "[t)he confidential
information was generated from the business and the business had a right to decide how to use it
prior to disclosing it to the public . ... " Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 321 (emphasis
added). Thus, the employee could rlisclose actual illegal acts on the theory that the firm lacked
any "right to decide how to use" this information. Also, the federal misprision statute should
preempt and ove.dde any contrary ,tat.. common law rule requiring the employee not to disclose
:.1~ knowledge of illegal acts, 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), but other sensitive information would remain
'lperty of the corporation.
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mail and wire fraud statute into an Official Secrets Act. 66 Much controversy
has surrounded the government's use of an espionage statute to prosecute
Samuel Morison, a government employee who gave copies of photographs
taken by reconnaissance satellite to a British military journal, Jane's Defense
Weekly. 67 Ironically, few have noticed that Carpenter converts the mail and
wire fraud statutes into a far more potent and potentially universally applicable weapon by which the government can deter its employees from leaking
information.
To prevent this overbroad result, Carpenter should be restricted so as to
apply only to trade secrets having "independent economic value" (in the
words of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 68 However, Carpenter does not use
the phrase "trade secret" (which has a limiting common law gloss), but instead employs the far more nebulous term "confidential information." The
only limiting phrases used by the Court in Carpenter with respect to the scope
66. One post-Carpenter decision has applied that decision's logic to a governmental employee
who leaked information to a bidder about the specifications for a postal service project. United
States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However, in upholding his conviction, the
court of appeals emphasized that it was not holding that any release of information by a governmental employee of confidential information would violate the mail fraud statute, but only information as to which the agency had a "proprietary interest." This is a sensible but very uncertain
distinction. If "proprietary interest" means simply that the matter was within the agency's jurisdiction, then this limitation will seldom have much effect. If it means that the agency is involved
in a profit-motivated transaction as to which the information relates, this distinction does not
square easily with Carpenter's broad language.
A related but more justifiable distinction would be to insist that the confidential information
amounts to a trade secret, that is, that it has "independent economic value" under the standard
definition of a trade secret. See supra note 57.
67. See United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985). The prosecution of Mr.
Morison was based on 18 U.S.C. § 793, which forbids communicating "information respecting the
national defense" to foreigners. For an outraged reaction to this prosecution, see Lewis, Silence
by Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1988, at A27, col. 1. There are numerous issues surrounding the
proper construction of Section 793. See Edgar and Schmidt, Curtiss- Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1986); Tigar, note 53
supra. Mail and wire fraud are much easier statutes for the prosecutor to use and thus could
more easily become an equivalent of an Official Secrets Act.
Some recent decisions have also begun to expand 18 U.S.C. § 641 in a similar fashion. This
statute forbids theft, conversion or unauthorized disposition of governmental property. After Carpenter, it becomes even easier to find that the term "property," as used in Section 641, includes
any confidential information possessed by the government. Some decisions predating Carpenter
had already approached this result. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971)
(transcripts of grand jury indictments prepared under contract with the United States remained
property of the government) cert. denied, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Girard,
601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant who sold information from Drug Enforcement Agency
computer files convicted of unauthorized sale of government property), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979); United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendant convicted of unauthorized sale of top secret government information to Soviet intelligence agent). See Edgar and
Schmidt, supra, at 401-06 for a critique of these decisions.
Note that if courts generally accept the test used in United States v. Perholtz, supra note 66,
that the government has a "proprietary interest" in the matter, this limitation should logically
apply equally to 18 U.S.C. § 641, which is at bottom a larceny statute.
68. See supra note 57.
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of the covered information were that the "confidential information be acquired or compiled by the corporation in the course and conduct of its
business" 69 and that "[t]he confidential information was generated from the
business and the business had a right to decide how to use it prior to disclosing it to the public. " 70 In contrast, the law on trade secrets has generally required that the information have independent economic value or confer some
commercial advantage and that the employer has taken reasonable efforts to
maintain its confidentiality.7 1 One post-Carpenter Second Circuit decision has
relaxed even the requirement that the confidential information belong to the
employer. 72
Other examples could be posed. Yet, the central dilemma raised by Carpenter follows from the next three premises:
(1) most adult Americans are employees;
(2) most possess some form of confidential information about their
employer; and
(3) most will at some point in their careers change employers.
Do all departing employees potentially face entanglement with the federal
criminal law? Even if actual prosecutions will be few, the threat of criminal
indictments and treble damage actions under RICO will still have a chilling
effect.

D.

What Remains of McNally?

In principle, Carpenter follows McNally in recognizing that a mere conflict
of interest is "too ethereal" a basis upon which to rest criminal liability. 73
This suggests that a majority of the Court does not accept Justice Stevens'
position, in footnote ten of his McNally dissent. Still, few conflicts of interest
are so uncomplicated as clearly to fall within this "ethereal" exception. Consider, for example, the Second Circuit's earlier decision in United States v.
69. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 320 (quoting W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1, at 260 (rev. ed. 1986)).
70. Id. at 321.
71 . For recent cases finding that confidential information did not amount to a trade secret, see
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to find
confidential scriptural materials to have requisite economic value to qualify as trade secret), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 388 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979) (material held not to be trade secret in criminal case where employer did not adequately
protect its secrecy).
72. United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (lawyer who trades on inside information known to his law firm but belonging to corporate client can be convicted under Carpenter
rationale). Clearly, this decision is correct, given Carpenter, but it suggests that those who receive
"stolen" information (such as a journalist who talks to a whistleblower) could also face liability.
73. Carpenter v. United States, 108 :;_ Ct. at 320 (contractual right to employee's honest and
faithful services is an interest ·"too ethereal" in itself to fall within the protection of the mail
1 · ·.ud statute.).

1988)

SYMl'OSIUM: COFFEE

143

Bronston, 74 where the defendant, an attorney, had continued to serve his own
personal client after his law firm had begun to represent a rival contender for
the same franchise. Presumably, this naked conflict would be insufficient today to support a conviction after McNal/y. However, if the prosecutor could
allege that the defendant had passed some information about the rival contender's plans or strategies to his own client, then this case would probably still
fall within Carpenter's reach. A more problematic case is United States v.
Condolon,7' where the defendant seduced a number of young women on the
false promise of placing them in films or modeling and was convicted of defrauding them of their intangible rights to privacy. Today, given that intangible property rights are recognized after Carpenter, the issue would seem to be
whether sexual favors fall within this category. Who knows? This uncertainty
underscores the discretion thus accorded the federal judiciary to decide what is
criminal.
In another well known pre-McNally case, employees of a collection agency
were convicted for tricking a telephone company into revealing the addresses
of defaulting customers whom they wanted to reach. 76 The prosecution's successful theory then was that the defendants defrauded these customers of their
ini:angible right to privacy. Clearly such a theory is dead after McNally, but
an alternative theory that might work would be that these defendants stole
information from the telephone company. To be sure, the information-street
addresses-had little or no economic value to the telephone company, but it
was nevertheless "confidential information" and clearly the property of the
company. If Carpenter truly meant to dismiss any requirement of economic
loss, then prosecutors need only say to themselves "Goodbye, intangible
rights; hello, intangible property," and proceed with business as usual. To illustrate the overbreadth of this theory, consider this hypothetical: several employees in an industrial shop work after hours to build themselves a sailboat
out of scrap lumber (which, while superfluous, had not b~en abandoned).
There is no economic loss here, but there is a property loss, and hence the
statute would seem to apply. 77
Few cases are necessarily reversed by McNally, at least outside the context
of public officials. The one major exception to this generalization are schemes
to defraud a government agency, either in order to obtain some form of Ii74. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
75. 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979).
76. United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978).
77. In fact, this hypothetical is not significantly different from United States v. Kelly, 507 F.
Supp. 495, 502-03 (E.D. Pa. 1981), where employees used the corporate computer in their personal business (although here the amount of the economic loss would be de minimis). Note, in
both this case and the preceding case involving addresses known to the telephone company, that if
we import an "independent economic value" test into Carpenter's vague reference to confidential
business information, these cases probably could not be successfully prosecuted, at least under
mail or wire fraud. See United States v. Perholtz, supra note 66. However, if the defendant
sought the names or addresses of customers because such a list could be re-sold and had economic value, a conviction seems possible.
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cense or approval or to avoid making a required filing. With some consistency, courts appear to be holding that the government is not deprived of a
property right that falls within the ambit of the mail and wire fraud statutes
under these circumstances. 78 However, these cases may well be reached by
other statutes, such as the Hobbs Act, the Travel Act, or under the theory
that there was a conspiracy to defraud the United States. 79 In addition, whenever there is a bribe paid to a governmental official, Justice Stevens' view that
the agent is defrauding the principal of the amount of the bribe could arguably be applied to reach even this case. 80
In the run-of-the mill kickback case, Carpenter may even have overruled a
defense that was available before McNally. Decisions in the Fifth Circuit had
apparently held that where there was a kickback paid by buyer or seller, but
the transaction occurred at an established market price, then the absence of
loss to the other party implied that it had not been defrauded. 81 Yet, to the
extent that courts adopt Justice Stevens' theory that the principal has a property interest in any bribe the agent receives, this defense is now cut off. Several recent cases appear to have adopted just this analysis in upholding
convictions for mail or wire fraud. 82

a

II.

THE Possmn.1TIES FOR JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS

Over the next several years, it is predictable that a substantial number of
employers will sue their former employees under RICO for conversion of trade
secrets, relying on mail or wire fraud as the predicate felony. Such cases have
always existed, but the chill grows colder when treble damages and the rhetoric of fraud are added to the landscape. Generally, these cases are "gray"
78. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988) (government's interest in
prohibiting arms sales to Iran does not amount to property right); United States v. Ochs, 842
F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1988) Gury instructions permitting conviction of conspiracy in mail fraud case
without finding of financial harm constituted reversible error); United States v. Italiano, 837 F.2d
1480 (I Ith Cir. 1988) (indictment charging mail fraud was invalid because it did not allege either
county or state was defrauded of money or property); United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621 (7th
Cir. 1987) (defrauding Treasury Department of currency transaction reports is not within wire
fraud statute); United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Sigmond v. Brown,
828 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's offer of proof in private RICO case, in order to show
alleged predicate acts of mail fraud, unsupported by evidence).
79. Under Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924), which the majority relies
upon in McNal/y, the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which makes criminal any effort "to defraud the
United States or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose," is much broader than
the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes and includes any effort "to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery or at least by means
that are dishonest." Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. at 188.
80. See supra note 22.
81. See United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737 (Former 5th Cir. 198S); United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981), modified on reh'g, 680 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1982) (insufficient evidence alleging that employers had suffered monetary damages did not
sustain defendants' convictions of mail fraud). But see United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566
(11th Cir. 1985).
82. See cases cited note 23 supra.
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ones with inherently mixed equities. Sometimes, the employee has misbehaved;
in other cases, the employer is merely using litigation to gain an unfair advantage. All virtue is not on one side of the courtroom aisle. If this reality is
acknowledged, then the chief deficiency of Carpenter is its myopia; it conceives of the role of the law in this area to be only that of protecting employers against deceitful employees. A more balanced assessment must recognize
that the law has multiple objectives and should not exclusively seek to protect
employers from employees, when the latter are also capable of being victimized.
Courts have a long history of dealing with overbroad precedents and finding
quiet ways to distinguish them. But how can a sensible court tame Carpenter's
embezzlement theory? Three distinct avenues to this end suggest themselves.
First, one can focus on the facts of Carpenter, in which there was an obvious kickback paid to Foster Winans from the profits of the insider trading
scheme while he remained a Journal employee. In the very different case
where the employee simply changes employment and then uses confidential information in the course of his new job, it can be argued that true embezzlement of intangible property has not occurred, because the employee remained
loyal so long as he was employed by his former employer. There are, however, weaknesses in this approach. What if the employee resigns to take a new
job at an unrealistic salary that reflects more the value of the information he
possesses than his own personal merit? Was his resignation now part of a
scheme to pass his employer's confidential data to a rival? This is a more
difficult case, but probably the cleanest way to deal with it is to define more
narrowly the actus reus of the crime. One might sensibly argue that embezzlement occurs only when the employee either covertly acquires the information
or covertly sells it (or otherwise converts it) while still in the employment of
the original employer. In short, unless there is a fraudulent act during the
course of the employment, no embezzlement occurs because the fiduciary duty
thereafter lapses. Perhaps, under some extreme circumstances, even a resignation could be deceitful where the employee hides the fact that he is transferring to a rival firm. Still, subsequent use of the information in the course of
a different employment would not constitute embezzlement, unless there was
some prior covert act.
Although it is far from certain that fiduciary duties lapse in this fashion
upon a change in employment, one argument for this cutoff is that the employee is otherwise caught in a hopeless position, because he also owes a duty
to the new employer to serve it diligently and not refrain from using any skill
or knowledge that the employee possesses. Interestingly, one pre-McNally decision seems to make exactly this distinction, finding in a private civil RICO
case (which was predicated on allegations of mail fraud) that for an employee's fiduciary violation to amount to mail fraud, some deceptive conduct had
to occur during the course of his employment. 83
83. See Hom's Inc. v. IM Int'! Publishing, 1986 Westlaw 11450, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide 6407
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This same argument can be rephrased in terms of the traditional law of
mail fraud. At least until Carpenter began to conceptualize mail fraud as a
crime of embezzlement, courts regularly emphasized that mail fraud required a
material misrepresentation or some other act of deceit. 84 A naked fiduciary
breach alone was not criminal; rather, it was the failure to disclose the conflict of interest that amounted to criminal deceit. If so, an employee who
openly announces that he is moving to a rival employer is deceiving no one,
even if he is committing a fiduciary or contractual breach. Nor should it be
seen as deceitful later to use information gained from the first employer because this is realistically foreseeable and implicit in the announcement of the
impending job change. So viewed, conduct engaged in at the eleventh hour
before this announcement, which sought to acquire confidential information
for use at the new job, might still be criminal (unless disclosed), but not the
use of information previously acquired. In this light, even Carpenter can again
be viewed as a case that on its facts involved both a fiduciary breach and a
failure to disclose.
A third route to this same end involves focusing on the mens rea of mail
and wire fraud, which, require specific intent. 85 Merely using confidential information gained during one employment to assist a different employer does not
imply that there was ever an intent to defraud during the course of the original employment. Arguably, such intent should only be inferred from truly de(S.D.N.Y. 1980). In this private RICO action, Horn's Inc. required all employees .to sign a secrecy
and noncompetition agreement after IM International Publishing had hired away at least nine
Horn's employees. Thereafter, IM hired an additional Hom's employee, who had signed the
agreement, allegedly in order to obtain a Horn's customer list. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead specific intent, but acknowledged that if plaintiff repleaded such intent,
the action could be maintained. It then suggested where the watershed lies between criminal and
non-criminal fiduciary misconduct by an employee who moves to a rival employer:
For an employee's theft of his employer's confide:i.tial information to amount to
mail fraud, the facts alleged must support an inference of intent on the part of the
employee to defraud or deceive his employer, either by affirmative misrepresentations
or by silence. Such intent clearly exists when the employee accepts his job having
determined to sell his employer's confidential information to a competitor. The same
is true where the employee has no such plan when he accepts employment and remains in his job pretending to be a loyal employee.

Id.
However, a simple resignation to join a competing firm would not amount to fraud, the court
noted, absent some covert conduct to acquire information while the employee was still with the
original firm. In short, the employee could breach the confidentiality agreement without committing a crime, so long as he did not engage in any pretense or deceit in order to gain information.
If so, he would be civilly, but not criminally, liable.
84. For an important case requiring that there be a material misrepresentation before a fiduciary breach could amount to criminal fraud, see United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 648 (7th
Cir. 1975) (defendant advertised that he used position in mayor's "inner circle" to award his firm
public contract), rert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). For another holding that a naked fiduciary
breach, standing alone, is not criminal, see United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1359 n.14
(9th Cir. 1988) (failure to prove fraudulent intent resulted in reversal of conviction).
85. See supra note 34.
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ceptive conduct, such as ransacking files or penetrating computer codes, where
the purpose to seek confidential information to sell to third parties is clear.
A final approach is to examine more closely the actual ownership of the
information. Possibly, both parties are entitled to use it, according either to
industry practice or the employee's own expectations. In some professions,
such as law and brokerage, it may be the normal practice for departing employees to take their customers with them and thus to keep the relevant files. 86
Moreover, the employer may owe in turn a fiduciary duty to the customer
that requires it to consent to the customer's choice and facilitate the transfer. 87
Few decisions have focused on this problem, except in the securities brokerage
field where at least one court has permitted brokers to solicit their former
clients. 88 The problem with this last approach, however, is that it may only
lead employers to rewrite their employees' manual and confidentiality agreements to make even more explicit that all information, including even the
identity of their customers, belongs to the employer. As a result, the employment agreement will become over time a contract of adhesion that contains an
effective covenant not to compete-one that ironically would probably be
unenforceable as a civil matter in most courts today.
In the final analysis, the key policy issue is the degree to which the criminal
law can be manipulated by employers into a weapon with which to threaten
their employees, chilling their ability to depart or form competitors. An unthinking devotion to the concept of fiduciary duties converts the criminal law
into an anti-competitive force by deterring the formation of those small startup firms that eventually become the major corporations of another generation.
III.

OVERCRIMINALIZATION REVISITED

So far, we have focused on only one aspect of one particular crime: the use
of fraud statutes to police employee misconduct with respect to confidential
information or trade secrets. But what does this focus tell us about th~
broader debate over "overcriminalization?" In that debate, those critics who
have cautioned against excessive reliance on its criminal sanction have generally stressed the ''adverse consequences to effective law enforcement of attempting to achieve conformity with private moral standards through the use
of the criminal law."8'.I The adverse consequences that they have pointed to
can be grouped under four headings:
86. Apparently, this was the conclusion reached by the court in an unreported New York Supreme Court case which resolved the dispute between E.F. Hutton and Shearson, Lehman over
the latter's hiring of the former's brokers; the decision found that brokers were customarily entitled in the industry to keep their customer lists. See Cowan, supra note 60.
87. At least in the legal profession, where clients have a right to the counsel of their choice, it
would seem that a law firm, once informed by the client that it wishes its business to be handled
by a former partner or associate of that firm, would have an obligation of its own not to interfere with the client's choice by seeking to enforce a noncompete agreement.
88. See Cowan, supra note 60.
89. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 314 ANNALS 157, 159 (1967).
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(1) increased disrespect for the law;
(2) heightened potential for corruption and discriminatory enforcement;
(3) the creation of a "crime tariff" that simply drives up prices and
eliminates competition; and
(4) the misallocation of law enforcement resources. 90
When these criticisms are applied to' so-called "victimless crimes" (such as
laws regulating sexual conduct betweeri consenting adults), there is probably a
consensus today that they have considerable force and merit. But this consensus fades, at least marginally, when the same criticisms are made of regulatory
statutes, particulary those that simply regulate economic behavior (such as the
laws prohibiting price-fixing, tax fraud, or insider trading). For example, it is
far from clear that there is a misallocation of enforcement resources, either in
enforcing insider trading laws against investment banking firms and their
members or in prosecuting price-fixing conspiracies in the electrical equipment
industry. In both cases, the centrality of these institutions and the potential
for repetition arguably justifies the cost. Nor does the "crime tariff" concept
(which argues that prohibition-type statutes simply raise the cost of the for bidden product) have as much applicability to the "white collar". context.
Thus, it is the first two arguments that merit closer examination in this context. The leading critic of using the criminal law to enforce ec<momic regulations, Professor Sanford Kadish, placed primary emphasis on a concern that
overuse of the criminal law would erode its moral authority. 91 He argued that
by using the criminal law simply to place a tax on the disfavored behavior, we
rob the criminal law of its distinctive stigma. Society is no longer expressing
its moral revulsion, but only its utilitarian preferences; the offender is no
longer a social outcast, but simply someone who owes the tax.
Although Professor Kadish's concerns are undoubtedly valid with respect to
many kinds of regulatory statutes, this is a problematic contention with respect
to the three great "white collar" scandals of recent decades-such as pricefixing in the 1960's, foreign payments in l 970's, and insider trading in the
1980's. Arguably, the clearest common denominator among these episodes has
been public support for the use of the criminal sanction. No contemporary
observer can mistake the fact that the public wanted Ivan Boesky to go to
jail. In all likelihood, public respect for the law might have suffered more if
Boesky had not been convicted or sentenced to prison. Of course, the public
may simply be responding to Boesky's seeming arrogance, which made J .R.
Ewing, the prime time villain of Dallas, seem modest by comparison. Alterna90. For such a summary of the principal claims made by those scholars concerned about overcriminalization (and a rebuttal of their claims), sec Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, .19
UCLA L. REV. 697 (1972).
91. See Kadish, Some Observations 011 tire Use of Cri111i11al Sa11ctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 423 (1963).
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tively, the key factor may be the long-standing populist distaste in much of
the country for Wall Street. Yet the public had a similarly negative reaction to
the price-fixing scandals of the 1950's in which sober, modest businessmen
from General Electrics, Westinghouse and other major firms received prison
sentences. In both cases, the clandestine character of the behavior-such as
price-fixing meetings in motels and under-the-table payments within prestigious
law and investment banking firms-deeply shocked the public.
This continuity in the public's revulsion over these quintessential "economic'' crimes provides some support for those who disagreed with Professor
Kadish. In an important article that drew on the sociological literature of their
day, Professors Ball and Friedman stressed the reciprocal and interactive relationship of the criminal law and the public morality. 92 At the risk of oversimplifying their views somewhat, I would summarize their essential argument as
being that the public learns what is immoral from what is criminal. Clearly,
this point that criminal prohibitions distinguish that which is truly immoral
and abhorrent to society from that which is only disfavored or taxed is perceptive, but it also can be pushed too far. During the illegal payments crisis
of the 1970's, it is clear that not all of the public was shocked by overseas
payments that amounted to bribes; many believed these payments were necessitated by counter-offers from competitors or by extortionate pressures. To
claim that any form of impropriety amounts to fraud eventually invites the
public to become cynical about the law's premises. 93
Neither Professor Kadish nor Professors Ball and Friedman fully recognize
that both may be right. That is, the public's reaction to the criminalization of
behavior not formerly thought immoral may be best understood as a specific
aJ)plication of the psychologist's familiar principle of cognitive dissonance: the
public reacts in both directions. On one hand, its respect for the law may be
diminished to some degree, but, on the other hand, its sense of what is immoral may also be expanded. Erosion in respect for the law can accompany a
community-wide reevaluation of the prevailing moral norms. If so, the tradeoff may be indeterminate from an ex ante perspective (although observable
enough ex post).
My point here is not to criticize either side in this debate, where both have
made valuable contributions, but to look for a deeper rationale for our intuitive sense that "overcriminalization" is an appropriate concern. Why should
policy-makers exercise restraint in their use of the criminal sanction, even
when they are honestly convinced that there are social gains from deterring the
92. See Ball & Friedman, supra note 10.
93. A case such as United States v. Weiss, supra note 12, is illustrative in this regard. There,
a corporate employee established an off-the-books slush fund at the direction of corporate superiors and never personally benefitted from it. The use to which the fund was put was never established, but may have been to engage in profit-maximizing, although possibly iJJegal, activities. The
Second Circuit sustained the conviction on the assumption that the stockholders were defrauded.
This seems a tenuous premise (although it is possible that they were). A narrower statute, such as
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, seems far more defensible, in part because it expresses a legislative judgment about the impropriety.
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disfavored behavior? Usually, when one considers the inexorable expansion of
the mail and wire fraud statutes, the first answer that comes to mind is that
expansion in the definition of criminal behavior may deny the citizen fair notice. Yet, this critique sounds oddly misdirected when applied to the case of
an Ivan Boesky or even a Foster Winans. Were they denied fair notice? The
covert character of their behavior creates a strong inference that they expected
their conduct would be found criminal (as also· did Boesky's quick plea bargain when caught). Still, to dismiss therefore the fair notice objection takes
too narrow a view of its broader rationale. Possibly the most penetrating comment in the debate about overcriminalization was made by Herbert Packer,
who wrote: "People ought in general to be able to plan their conduct with
some assurance that they can avoid entanglement with the criminal law .... " 94
At the core of Professor Packer's view of the criminal law is the idea that its
purpose is not to restrain, but to liberate.
But what does this mean? Let me suggest one meaning by beginning with
an extreme example. Suppose it could be shown that speeding "caused" some
40,000 highway deaths a year. Because the incentive to speed is presumably
not that high, the behavior should be deterrable (unlike other crimes such as
rape or homicide where the motives are less easily understood and potentially
more complex). Arguably, the lowest cost approach to deterrence might be to
combine relatively high penalties with relatively modest enforcement expenditures. 95 On this basis, one could justify severe ten-year sentences, or even the
death penalty, on the grounds that, hypothetically, half these deaths could be
averted by punishing severely a relatively few individuals who had, after all,
been fairly warned.
What is wrong with such a policy on these assumed facts, at least within
the narrowly utilitarian frame of reference that we are assuming? My answer
involves Packer's fundamental point that the law should liberate, rather than
restrain. To explain this position, I will use a shorthand term, "compliance
costs," to mean not only financial costs, but also the cost of uncertainty and
apprehension. Also, this term includes the social costs when citizens begin to
desist from socially desirable behavior (here, commuting by car) in order to
avoid the potential threat of the criminal law. The real problem with exemplary penalties for speeding is that each citizen must worry about the danger
that he will accidentally speed (or that in a moment of moral weakness that
94. H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 68.
95. Economists assume (probably correctly) that the costs of imprisonment and punishment are
far less than the costs of investigation and detection. Thus, the "cheapest" crime prevention strategy in their view is to combine very high penalties with sporadic enforcement. See R. POSNER,
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 7.2, at 207--08 (3d ed. 1986). Judge Posner also uses the example
of severe penalties to enforce the speeding laws to explain why the criminal law can overdeter.
His focus is exclusively on the social loss caused by socially desirable (or economically efficient)
activities that are deterred. In contrast, even if legal activities are not deterred, I believe there is a
loss in terms of the personal anxiety experienced by the actor who is subjected to this threat. In
short, threatening people involves costs even when it works and there is no deterrence of socially
desirable behavior.
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he will deliberately do so, given his lack of moral inhibition about a form of
behavior that he regards as morally neutral). As a result, the citizen becomes
"entangled" (in Packer's phrase) with the criminal law. 96 At least if he drives,
he must exert conscious effort on a continuing basis to avoid violating this
penal provision, and he incurs additional costs to the extent he fears that he
will commit a violation.
Fair notice alone does not minimize these costs; only restricting the scope of
the criminal law can do that. Compliance costs are significantly reduced, however, when the criminal law simply reflects the public morality, because then
the citizen has (to some extent) already internalized these restraints as inhibitions. In short, the supposed social gains from regulatory interventions that
the criminal law could enforce arc easily overstated because we tend to ignore
what I have termed "compliance costs" in our social accounting. These costs
are real, if invisible, and involve chiefly the anxiety that the citizen must face
when conduct that is integral to his job, position, or style of life is closely
regulated by the criminal law.
To move from the extreme example just considered to the real world, let us
return to Carpenter and consider the potential for entanglement with the criminal law that it poses. The Carpenter court sent a message to all employees: if
they acquire confidential business information from one employer and later
change employment, they must be extremely careful about how they use that
information thereafter. In short, we are again facing "compliance costs" and
what Packer calls "entanglement. " 97 Under the Carpenter Court's holding, a
citizen who changes jobs must continually face a question that might baffle a
Zen Buddhist monk: How does one know something and yet not use it? Even
for the diligently law-abiding citizen, this question involves uncertainty, as do
the gray issues concerning the scope of the information to which Carpenter
applies. Of course, this criminal prohibition will be only sporadically enforced,
but this only brings us face to face with the second criticism raised by the
critics of "overcriminalization," namely, the danger of selective or discriminatory enforcement. Unless one believes that prosecutorial discretion is always
used wisely, one must admit the potential for arbitrary enforcement here. At
least sometimes, prosecutors may indict in marginal cases in order to secure
testimony or cooperation in other cases. 98 Moreover, private actions under the
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing Packer's view that criminal law
should liberate, not restrain citizens).
97. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing Packer's concern with "overcriminalization" and entanglement).
98. Mail fraud cases reveal this pattern clearly. For example, in United States v. Bronston, 658
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), an attorney was convicted essentially
for violating a rule of legal ethics prohibiting representation of clients with conflicting interests.
While not so held, the author believes that the prosecutors' real interest in pursuing this marginal
case was to obtain evidence of political payoffs by high officials in New York City government.
No such later prosecutions ensued, but Mr. Bronston served time in jail. Similarly, the prosecution in United States v. Weiss, supra note 12, was clearly aimed at obtaining evidence to be used
against higher corporate officials within the same company.
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RICO statute, which permits the use of mail and wire fraud as predicate felonies, are certain to push Carpenter's theory to the limits of its logic and probably beyond.
Where do these observations lead? To my mind they suggest the desirability
of narrow, context-specific statutes (such as Rule lOb-5) as opposed to
broader, sprawling rules borrowed from the common law. The latter inherently
involve a much greater prospect of entanglement (or, in my phrase, higher
compliance costs). However awkwardly misappropriation theory might extend
Rule lOb-5, it tells citizens only to be cautious in their behavior in a narrowly
defined context (the sale and purchase of securities). In contrast, the Carpenter
Court's embezzlement theory warns them that the criminal law applies to their
everyday behavior as employees and requires that they observe constraints that
are not built into their culture as part of the public morality. As a result, it
universalizes the problem of compliance costs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Old wine has been poured into new bottles. The pre-McNally doctrine of
intangible rights has died only to be reborn as a theory of intangible property
in Carpenter. Whatever the intent of the McNa/ly Court and whatever the language in Carpenter about not criminalizing those conflicts that are ''too ·ethereal" to· merit the criminal sanction, 99 the theory that confidential information
is just another form of property, which disclosure to a third party "embezzles" by depriving the employer of exclusive possession, raises the prospect of
overcriminalization far more forcefully than did any of the prior ''white collar" crime controversies of the 1960's and 1970's. In particular, Carpenter's
apparent assertion that there can be a property loss without an economic loss
is one that a legislature may be entitled to make (because political accountability can excuse illogical reasoning), but which seems unprincipled for a court to
adopt.
Unless constrained, the mail and wire fraud statutes could soon amount to a
Federal Trade Secrets Act, with criminal prohibitions more sweeping than any
state has yet enacted. Worse yet, these statutes could even evolve into an Official Secrets Act which could threaten any governmental employee who leaks
information. 100 All this has been accomplished by a Court that normally gives
great deference to the legislature and federalism, but which in Carpenter
speaks as if there is a federal common law of trade secrets. 101
99. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 6~67 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d
343 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (court upheld mail fraud conviction based on economic misappropriation
theory). The District of Columbia Circuit seems to be taking some care to avoid making mail
fraud co-extensive with espionage and related statutes dealing with the release of information by
governmental agents. My preference would be to limit mail fraud to cases where the information's
release caused an immediate economic injury to the government (such as by forcing it to pay
more in a contractual negotiation); injuries to national defense interests should be prosecuted exclusively under the espionage statutes and possibly under 18 U.S.C. § 641.
101. New York has recognized an employer's property right in trade-related confidential infor-
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Ultimately, the most serious problem with Carpenter's equation of the law
of agency with the law of fraud is not simply that it is judicial legislation, but
that it amounts to one-sided legislation. Both employees and employers can
behave opportunistically and "cheat" the other with respect to trade secrets
and confidential information. An employee could steal a trade secret to which
he has no conceivable entitlement (for example, the secret formula for CocaCola), while the employer may deprive the employee of what the economist
calls his "human capital" by restricting his mobility. 102 The former kind of
opportunism is covered by the criminal law, but the latter is not.
If Carpenter's logic suggests that the employer will now gain further leverage by which to restrict the employee, this is probably a predictable consequence of criminalizing the law of agency. Despite the noble rhetoric in which
the law of agency frames its rules, that body of law, when examined in its
historical setting, looks suspiciously like a class-biased product of a pre-industrial, aristocratic society. Indeed, the very language of the law of agency-with
its symptomatic references to master and servant-reminds us that it was
shaped by courts that in fact wanted masters to remain masters and servants
to remain servants. This inherent bias in the law of agency has not had significant consequences for commercial law, both because agency law principles
may be more honored in the breach than in the observance and because it is
generally possible to contract out of its rules. However, criminalizing agency
law through the use of mail and wire fraud statutes makes this body of law
more mandatory and forces us to reexamine whether contemporary labor relations should actually be governed by agency law's one-sided favoritism for the
employer. Should the creative employee who himself creates the confidential
information necessarily be regarded as a mere "servant" and all ownership
interest in this intellectual property be given automatically to the employer, or
should employer and employee be regarded as joint venturers? 103 The irony in
mation. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969) (cited in Carpenter v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. at 321) (setting limitations of disclosure for individuals privy to information
derived from confidential or fiduciary relationships). This still leaves open the question of whether
other states would also adopt Diamond's property right theory. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584
F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (declining to accept Diamond v. Oreamuno as Indiana law). Is Carpenter
then to be viewed as a decision applicable only to states that would recogniz.e such a property
right? Probably not, because the interpretation of the mail fraud statute has historically not been
dependent on state law. Because it is not so dependent, a federal common Jaw of trade secrets
may soon emerge. Moreover, this body of federal criminal law is inconsistent with even New York
Jaw, which criminalizes only the theft or unauthorized use of "secret scientific material." See
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of this concept, see G. BECK.ER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964); Rubin and
Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, IO J. OF LEGAL SruoIFS 93 (1981). The
employee could be Jocked into his present employer, because his inability to use the confidential
information that constitutes his human capital makes him less employable elsewhere. Once he is
trapped in this manner, he can then be paid a below-market wage.
103. A third position is to leave it to private contracting between employer and employee.
However, even if one takes this position, it does not necessarily follow that private parties should
be able to resort to the public remedy of the criminal law when the contract is breached. As the

154

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAw REVIEW

{Vol. 26:121

Foster Winans' position is that he was convicted for embezzling information
that he alone created; that is, prior to the publication of his column, the Wall
Street Journal's trade secrets typically existed only in his mind. His case is
thus very different from the employee who seeks to acquire secret formulas
created by others in order to sell them to the firm's rivals, but the law of
agency recognizes no distinction between these two cases.
Arguably, no tears should be shed for Mr. Winans because he should have
known his conduct violated the federal securities laws. 104 Still, the logic of his
case could similarly support the conviction of a salesperson who departs one
firm (or is fired by it), taking his customer lists in order to solicit old customers from a rival firm. Such a result may seem extreme, and courts may resist
it. Nonetheless, it illustrates the greatest deficiency with judicial legislation of
the type that Carpenter exemplifies: legislation is never neutral. Because the
legislature is politically accountable, it is entitled to favor one coalition of interests over another, but this is an activity that courts should avoid. To a
degree that is still uncertain, Carpenter shifts power and social control to employers and away from employees. That it does so unthinkingly and out of
devotion to the black letter law of agency does not excuse the result.

text suggests, my view is that there are imperfections with the private contracting process in the
labor market that make total reliance on it unwarranted. Accordingly, with respect to intellectual
property that is jointly created (that is, to which the employee made some creative contribution),
the criminal law should not enforce a bargain that would require the employee to sacrifice his
human capital. Under this approach, both civil and criminal Jaw would treat contractual provisions or work rules relating to confidentiality in the same manner as covenants not to compete,
and thus enforce them only to the extent they were found reasonable.
104. For a simpler theory on which Winans might have been prosecuted more appropriately, see
note 38 supra.

